











#### - an integer (from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ )

Discrete Exponentiation problem:

## Given (q, x), find qx

generator of a finite group (of order q)

# ne discrete exponentiation problem is "easy"

(in the sense that there are <u>PPT ALGORITHMS</u> that solve <u>ARBITRARY</u> discrete exponentiation instances)

#### Just how "easy" is it?

## X = 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 $QX = ((((((((((((((()))^{2}g^{0})^{2}g^{0})^{2}g^{0})^{2}g^{1})^{2}g^{0})^{2}g^{1})^{2}g^{0})^{2}g^{1})^{2}g^{0})^{2}g^{1})^{2}g^{0})^{2}g^{1}$

If |g|=q, then cost ~ |gq| squares and ~ (|gq)/2 multiplies

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(on average)

#### Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem:

an integer (from  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ )

generator of a finite group (of order q)

Given (q, q<sup>x</sup>), find x

### Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption: (hand-wavy version) I infinite families of groups w.r.t which The DL problem is "hard"

(in the sense that no PPT Algorithm can solve UNIFORM RANDOM DL instances in the groups comprising the family)

#### Just how "hard" is it?

"Baby-step"  $g, g^2, g^3, ..., g^{\lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil - 1}$ 

> "Giant-step"  $g^{\sqrt{q}}, g^{2\sqrt{q}}, \dots, g^{\sqrt{q}}$

 $g^{\chi}/qa \stackrel{2}{=} qb[\sqrt{q}]$  $\Rightarrow g^{\chi} = q^{\alpha+b}\sqrt{q}$ 

#### Just how "hard" is it?

"Baby-step"  $g, g^2, g^3, ..., g^{\lceil \sqrt{q} \rceil - 1}$ 

> "Giant-step"  $g\sqrt{q}, g\sqrt{q}, g\sqrt{q}^2$

If |g|=q, then cost  $\leq 2q^{\frac{1}{2}}$  multiplies

#### Cost of "square-and-multiply" grows with number of 1 digits in the exponent

#### Bright idea (?): Choose exponents having few 1 bits!

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## The LHW-DL problem is "sorta hard"

**Relationship Status:** 

Interested in:

Looking for:

Single In a Relationship Engaged Married

It's Complicated In an Open Relationship Widowed





If |g|=q, then  $cost \sim 2\binom{[lgq]}{t/2}$  exps

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#### Optimizations

1. Minimal change ordering  $\Rightarrow$  exps in cost become mults! 2. Interleaving baby- and giant-steps (large constant plus) - Small asymptotic speedup 3. Iterate over "splitting systems" asymptotic speedup 2

best known

"deterministic' complexity

#### x = 1100101011101100000010Run giant step over other half



No collision? -

 $\rightarrow$  Shift halves by 1 bit (cyclically)





#### x = 1100101011101100000010

7 ones, 4 zeros

3 ones, 8 zeros

#### x = 1100101011101100000010



6 ones, 5 zeros

10

4 ones, 7 zeros

#### x = 1100101011101100000010

6 or set 5 zer os.

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6 CELOS

5 ones, 6 zeros @-

10

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Hones Kerse

5 ones, 6 zeros

#### x = 1100101011101100000010

- · Two loops:
  - "Outer loop" runs over m/2 cyclic shifts
  - "Inner loop" iterates over  $\leq 2 \times \binom{\lceil (\lg q)/2 \rceil}{1 + 12}$

 $\Rightarrow \text{Total cost:} \leq m \left( \begin{bmatrix} (\lg q)/2 \\ \lfloor t/2 \end{bmatrix} \right)$ 

#### Pascal's Lemma



 $\binom{n-1}{k}$  of the  $\binom{n}{k}$  values in each iteration were also computed in the previous iteration!

#### Pascal's Lemma



### Can save a factor $\approx \left( \frac{\lceil (\lg q)/2 \rceil}{\lfloor t/2 \rfloor} \right) \left( \frac{\lceil (\lg q)/2 \rceil - 1}{\lfloor t/2 \rfloor - 1} \right) \approx m/t$ work

#### Pascal's Lemma



Total cost:  $\leq t \begin{pmatrix} \lceil (\lg q)/2 \rceil \\ \lfloor t/2 \rfloor \end{pmatrix} + o(1)$ 

## - and a *promise* that "x has Radix-b weight t « log<sub>b</sub> q" Low-Radix-b-Weight DL (LRWb-DL) problem: Given (g, g<sup>x</sup>), Find x

#### Q: How hard is the Low-Radix-b-Weight DL problem?

## The LRNh-DL problem is about as hard as the LHW-DL problem

#### Add "innermost loop" over the (b-1)<sup>t/2</sup> possibilities for the non-zero digits

 $\Rightarrow$  pick up an extra (b-1)<sup>t/2</sup> factor in cost

- partially offset by shorter radix-b length and (if we're lucky) lower radix-b weight

### If B>b and radix-B density < radix-b density, then radix-B algorithm is faster

THM: (hand-wavy version)

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Zero-knowledge Password Policy Checks and Verifier-based PAKE Kiefer and Manulis ESORICS 2014

> Before: "Provably secure" Now: "Demonstrably insecure"

Association for Computing Machinery

> ASIA CCS'16 Proceedings of the 11th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

ACM SIGSAC Supported by: NSFC, Baidu, Huawei, and Clover Sec

Blind Password Registration for Verifier-Based PAKE Kiefer and Manulis AsiaPKC 2016

Before: "Provably secure" Now: "Demonstrably insecure"



A Provably-Secure and Efficient Verifier-Based Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Yang, Jiang, Xu, Hou, Zhao, and Choo TrustCom/BigDataSE/ISPA 2016 Before: "Provably secure" Now: "Demonstrably insecure"

#### Where do we go from here?



# Lattice crypto! Low-weight secret keys (vectors) low weight linear combinations other risky "low-weight" ideas...

#### That's all for today, folks!